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CAN FAMILIES BE EFFICIENT?
A FEMINIST APPRAISAL
-Ifnn ,raquer £stin*
This Article examines the convergence of feminist and law and
economics theory on family law questions, particularly issues of marriage
and divorce. Both feminist legal theory and law and economics analysis
have come to occupy a significant place in the American legal academy,
demonstrated by growing numbers of conferences, journals, casebooks
and monographs, and electronic mail lists in each area.' Not surprisingly,
as the two fields have grown, they have begun to touch, to overlap, and
occasionally to come into conflict. This process has been evident in the
extensive literature on sex discrimination in employment and is increas-
ingly apparent in writing on family law issues.
Laws governing financial aspects of divorce, including alimony and
property division rules, have been subjected to both types of theorizing;
in some cases, the policy recommendations of feminist and economics
theorists have converged. But the two frameworks are also remarkably
different in their goals, their methods and their values. These differences
emerge in both the prescriptions for legal change and the descriptive
methodology of each approach.
Economists, and many of those in law and economics, have drawn
a sharp distinction between positive and normative economic theory.
Feminist analysis, however, suggests that the boundary between positive
and normative approaches is not easily drawn, or easily maintained,
particularly when focusing on non-market behavior, such as in family
relationships. My goal with this Article is to put these methodological
Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. I presented an early version
of this paper at the Feminism and Legal Theory Workshop, Columbia Law School,
on February 25, 1995. My thanks to Martha Fineman, Jane Maslow Cohen, Jennifer
Gerarda Brown, Margaret Brinig and the other participants in the workshop for their
comments.
1. I use "feminist" to denote theory which centers on women's experiences and the
diverse social, economic, and historical contexts of women's lives. For a useful intro-
duction, see TiEoREmTcAi PERsPEcTrvEs ON SExuAL DIFFERENCE (Deborah L. Rhode
ed., 1990). See also Gary Lawson, Feminist Legal Theories, 18 HALv. J.L. & PUB.
PoL'Y 325 (1995) (elaborating a number of possible definitions of feminist legal
theory). For an introduction to law and economics, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS
ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (1988); RICsARw A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAw (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter POSNER, ANALYSIS]. See also JOYCE P. JACOBSEN, THE
ECONOMICS OF GENDER (1994).
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issues into sharper relief, and to suggest some conclusions as to the
potential and limits of economic approaches to family law in light of the
feminist critique.
Part I of this Article outlines the conventional distinction between
positive and normative economics, describes some feminist responses to
economic theory, and discusses how these two distinct frameworks have
converged and diverged in the ongoing debate over financial aspects of
divorce. Part II elaborates a series of problems that emerge at the inter-
section of economics, feminism and family law, demonstrates that the
boundary between positive and normative theory is highly unstable in
this setting, and finally argues that prescriptive economic analysis of the
family is problematic for feminist theorists because of the narrow de-
scriptive models on which economic theories are built. Part III poses the
question asked in the tide of this piece: can families be efficient? After
questioning whether normative economic analysis can be sensibly em-
ployed in this setting, this article concludes that efficiency norms are not
adequate unless the descriptive models more fully address a wider range
of issues of particular concern to women.
I. FRAMEWORKS
As many writers have noted, economics as an academic discipline
has been resistant to feminist theory.2 The primary reason is historical:
for most of its life span, economics as a discipline was not interested in
women. Classical and neoclassical models of economic activity con-
structed the market as the sphere of production, the sphere of exchange,
the sphere of economic life. The family was seen as entirely distinct, and
women's work in the family sphere was invisible and not valued.3
More recent generations of economists have revised this view using
economic methods to develop a theory addressing household production
and family behavior.4 Their "new home economics" has been primarily
2. See generally BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIsT THEORY AND ECONOMICS (Marianne
A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 1993) [hereinafter BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN];
Marianne A. Ferber, The Study of Economics: A Feminist Critique, 107 AM. EcON.
AsS'N PRoc. 357 (1995).
3. I have described this more fully in another artide. See Ann Laquer Estin, Love and
Obligation: Family Law and the Romance ofEconomics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 989,
991-99 (1995) [hereinafter Estin, Love and Obligation].
4. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A T.ATSE ON THE FAMILY (enlarged ed. 1991) [herein-
after BECKER, FAMILY]. For an early analysis of this work, see Isabel V. Sawhill, Eco-
nomic Perspectives on the Family, DAEDALUs, Spring 1977, at 115, and Marianne A.
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descriptive, developing explanations for patterns of family behavior from
birth and education through courtship, marriage, divorce and bequests.
Some aspects of these new models, particularly the recognition that work
in the home has real productive value, are extraordinarily important.
There are many examples of the large gaps in traditional legal and
economic thought where women's work is concerned: household labor
is excluded from such statistical measures as the Gross National Product
(GNP); it is ignored in the comparison of household living standards; it
is not fully recognized by public benefits and tax laws; and it is treated
differently than market labor in a wide range of tort, contract and family
law doctrines. In each of these areas, the new home economics provides
a vocabulary and analytic framework that can be usefully employed to
begin filling the gaps.5 This means that economic theories can help to
remedy legal practices that have been consistently harmful to women's
interests.
6
At the same time, feminist theorists in law and in economics have
challenged the descriptive model of the new home economics on a
number of grounds. Although the model can be useful, it leaves out a
great deal. Using the highly abstract approach and streamlined assump-
tions that are typical of economic proof, the new theory describes
courtship, marriage, fertility, divorce, and making gifts and bequests to
family members, as rational, utility-maximizing behavior. Economists
describe the gender-based division of labor in the household as efficient,
in the sense that it allows a family to generate a maximum level of utility
with a given set of resources.7 But because these models omit much of
the context and complexity of family life, the conclusions they yield have
often seemed inadequate.
Ferber & Bonnie G. Birnbaum, The New Home Economics: Retrospects and Prospects,
4 J. CONSUMER REs. 19 (1977). See also Estin, Love and Obligation, supra note 3, at
999-1016.
5. See generally Estin, Love and Obligation, supra note 3.
6. One important example is the growing use of opportunity cost and human capital
concepts in the debate over alimony and property division in divorce. See, e.g., E.
Raedene Combs, The Human Capital Concept as a Basis for Property Settlement at
Divorce, 2 J. DIVORCE 329 (1979); Joan M. Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing
Spouse' Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital 28 U.
KA. L. REV. 379 (1980). But cf Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New
Theory ofAlimony, 82 GEo. L.J. 2227, 2276 (1994) (criticizing the use that has been
made of human capital analysis).
7. See BEcKER, FAMILY, supra note 4, at 30-53.
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For feminists, the problem with these economic models is not only
that they are so abstract, but that the analysis often assumes precisely
those points which we would most like to explore. Writing in 1977,
Isabel Sawhill suggested that we should ask whether economists "have
done anything more that describe the status quo in a society where sex
roles are 'givens'-defined by culture, biology, or other factors not
specified in the economic model."' Other feminist theorists have been far
blunter? Also, as many have noted, the economists' conclusion that the
traditional, gender-structured household is efficient depends to a great
extent on factors the model does not examine, particularly women's
comparative disadvantage in the labor force.'"
In addition, there is a methodological distance between economic
analysis and feminist legal theory which makes the two difficult to assimi-
late to each other. This has been elaborated in writing by a number of
feminist economists, who advocate broadening the recognized methods
of economic inquiry to include a variety of less quantitative methods. For
example, Julie Nelson calls for a process of "imaginative rationality."1"
Along the same lines, Donald McCloskey describes the need for metaphor
and story to supplement fact and logic, for questionnaires and interviews
8. Sawhill, supra note 4, at 120; see also Fetber & Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 21
("Clearly tradition is the dominant factor in determining the division of tasks within
the family.").
9. See, e.g., BARBARA P, BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 266-73
(1986) (arguing in response to Becker that men's economic power is the basis for
inequality between men and women within households); MARILYN WAUNG, IF
WOMEN COUNTED 37-39 (1988) (referring to Becker as "the new high priest of
patriarchal economics"); Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson, Introduction. The
Social Construction of Economics and the Social Construction of Gender, in BEYOND
ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 2, at 1, 6 (describing feminist criticisms of Becker's
work); see also Paula England, The Separative Self Androcentric Bias in Neoclassical
Assumptions, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 2, at 37, 41-49; Diana
Strassman, Not a Free Market: The Rhetoric of Disciplinary Authority in Economics, in
BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 2, at 54, 58-63.
10. See Ferber & Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 20-21; Gillian K. Hadfleld, Households at
Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 GRo. L.J. 89, 97
(1993); see ao Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits
of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEo. L.J. 2423, 2437-47 [hereinafter
Singer, Alimony and Efficiency]; infia Part I.B.
11. Julie A. Nelson, The Study of Choice or the Study of Provisioning? Gender and the
Definition of Economics, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 2, at 23, 30; see
Nelson, supra, at 29-31; see also Ferber, supra note 2, at 359; Myra H. Strober,
Rethinking Economics Through a Feminist Lens, 106 AM. ECON. ASS'N PROC. 143
(1994).
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as well as numerical data sets, and for observation and conversation in
addition to mathematical proofs. 2
Some of the feminist objections to economic theories and methods
are familiar from other literature critiquing neoclassical economic theory
and the uses to which it has been put in law. Thus, many writers have
argued that economists' premise that interpersonal utility comparisons are
impossible serves to conceal distributive concerns and to defeat the
possibility for larger "value" judgments.13 There are also numerous critics
of neoclassical theory who call for greater attention to issues of power,
inequality and other social factors."
Although these types of criticism are repeated throughout the legal
academy, they seem particularly sharp whenever economic analysis is
brought beyond the sphere of explicit market activities." In the context
of family law, economic models are less readily tested or falsified than
models used to analyze market behavior, because in the family there is
no common currency for measuring value. Models based on self-interest
also seem less adequate to explain family behavior, because of the broad
spectrum of motivations we recognize in "private" life,16 and the many
competing normative visions of the family as a social institution.17 All of
the standard criticisms of the economic approach take on added intensity
when economic theory is employed not simply to describe and explain
12. See Donald N. McCloskey, Some Consequences of a Conjective Economics, in BEYOND
ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 2, at 69, 69.
13. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 3 (1975); James Boyd White, Economics andLaw: Two Cultures in Tension,
54 TENN. L. REv. 161, 172-75 (1986).
14. See, e.g., Ferber & Nelson, supra note 9, at 12-13 (citing these scholars as examples:
KENNETH E. BOULDING, THREE FACES OF POwER (1989); ROBERT FRANK, CHOOSING
THE RIGHT POND (1985); ROBERT M. SOLow, THE LABOR MARICET AS SOCIAL
INSTruON (1990)). Related points are made in the legal literature. See, e.g., Baker,
supra note 13, at 37-41; White, supra note 13, at 185-93.
15. On the question of "economic imperialism," see generally Robert D. Cooter, Law
and the Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Law and
a Review of the Major Books, 29 UCLA L. REv. 1260 (1982). For a discussion of the
advantages of economics beyond its sphere, see Ronald H. Coase, Economics and
Contiguous Disciplines, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 209-10 (1978).
16. This is a particularly strong theme in feminist criticisms of economics, which have
stressed the importance of factors beyond self-interest, such as empathy, connection,
and altruism. See England, supra note 9, at 45-48.
17. This is not to suggest that the older models, based upon a rigid separation of public
or market life from households and the family, are preferable. See supra notes 3-6
and accompanying text; infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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family behavior, but to provide a normative base for a variety of specific
family policy recommendations.
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A. Positive and Normative Economics
Neoclassical economics is staunchly positivist. Milton Friedman, in
his classic essay on economic methods, explains the point this way:
Positive economics is in principle independent of any
particular ethical position or normative judgments. As Keynes
says, it deals with "what is," not with "what ought to be." Its
task is to provide a system of generalizations that can be used
to make correct predictions about the consequences of any
change in circumstances. Its performance is to be judged by the
precision, scope, and conformity with experience of the predic-
tions it yields. In short, positive economics is, or can be, an
"objective" science, in precisely the same sense as any of the
physical sciences.1 9
In order to predict various types of behavior, economists utilize
models that are highly abstract and mathematical. To those who object
that these models omit too many variables, the customary response is
that economic science is descriptive, not prescriptive, and these are not
normative findings in any event.2" Economic theorists argue that it is
necessary to reduce the number of variables under consideration in order
to develop testable hypotheses. Thus, these greatly simplified models of
behavior are a prerequisite for rigorous scientific analysis. Again, in the
words of Professor Friedman:
18. Despite the controversies over economic "imperialism," there are a number of "true
believers" prepared to enact family legislation based purely on efficiency criteria. Gary
Becker writes regularly in Business Week magazine, offering proposals on a wide range
of policy matters, including no-fault divorce and child support enforcement. See Gary
S. Becker, Finding Fault with No-fault Divorce, Bus. WK., Dec. 7, 1992, at 22
[hereinafter Becker, Finding Fault]; Gary S. Becker, Unleash the Bill Collectors on
Deadbeat Dads, Bus. WK., July 18, 1994, at 18, 18 [hereinafter Becker, Deadbeat
Dads]; see also Ann Laquer Estin, Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2 U. CHI.
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 517, 524-29 (1995) [hereinafter Estin, Economics] (discussing
the application of efficiency theories to divorce decisions).
19. MILTON FRIEDmAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in EssAYs IN Posnvp
ECONOMIcs 3, 4 (1953) (citing JOHN NVLIE KEYNas, THE ScoPE AND METHOD
OF POLITCAL ECoNoMY 34-35, 46 (1891)).
20. See, e.g., POSNER, ANALYSIs, supra note 1, at 16-17.
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A hypothesis is important if it "explains" much by little, that
is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the
mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the
phenomena to be explained and permits valid predictions on
the basis of them alone. To be important, therefore, a hy-
pothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions; it takes
account of, and accounts for, none of the many other atten-
dant circumstances, since its very success shows them to be
irrelevant for the phenomena to be explained.2
Economists relegate normative work to a second arena of economic
inquiry, known as "welfare economics."22 This type of analysis deploys
notions of efficiency to determine whether a "particular proposed policy
or legal change[ ] will make individuals affected by it better off in terms
of how they perceive their own welfare ... ." In general, the norms
used in welfare economics assume and predict that "private ordering,"
based on individual rather than collective decisions, will lead to better
outcomes across society.2
4
Economists recognize that their normative contributions depend
heavily on an underlying positive analysis. According to Friedman:
"Normative economics and the art of economics, on the other hand,
cannot be independent of positive economics. Any policy conclusion
necessarily rests ... on a prediction that must be based-implicitly or
explicitly-on positive economics." 25 Friedman is not suggesting that
normative economics can be reduced to a positive analysis; rather, his
view is that an accurate descriptive account must precede the attempt to
make policy prescriptions.26
Law and economics has also laid claim to a positivist methodology.
Most of the important early work generated accounts that explained legal
aspects of economic regulation, beginning with subjects such as antitrust.
21. FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 14-15; see POSNER, ANALYsIs, supra note 1, at 16-18;
see also MICHAEL J. TREBILCOcK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CoNRAlcr 3-6
(1993).
22. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 21, at 7-8.
23. TREBILCOCK, supra note 21, at 7.
24. See POSNER, ANALYSis, supra note 1, at 13-16.
25. FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 5.
26. See FRiEDMAN, supra note 19, at 5 (suggesting that many, but not all policy disagree-
ments trace to different predictions about the effects of a given policy change, and
therefore "the progress of positive economics" could help resolve differences about
economic policy).
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Over time, "law and economics" began spreading to a wide range of
other fields.17 In this process, law and economics has followed the lead
of economic theorists, who have also directed their attention far beyond
behavior in explicit markets.2"
In law and economics, it is more difficult to maintain the econo-
mists' traditional boundary between positive and normative analysis.29
Thus, although Richard Posner defends his theory against charges of
reductionism or essentialism on the basis that it is intended as descriptive
rather than prescriptive," his critics have noted that he has a tendency
to mix normative judgments liberally in his positive analysis. 1 Other law
and economics theorists place themselves more explicitly in the normative
or welfare economics tradition.32 As Judge Posner himself suggests, the
27. Judge Richard Posner, in his textbook, describes this as "the economic theory of law."
POSNER, ANLYSIs, supra note 1, at 23-25 (noting that this larger inquiry includes
what he calls "the efficiency theory of the common law," which is based on the
hypothesis that some legal rules serve economic efficiency goals). See also Richard A.
Posner, Some Uses andAbuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L Rav. 281 (1979)
[hereinafter Posner, Uses and Abuses].
The arenas for economic analysis of law now range from antitrust, tax and
corporate law, to laws governing a variety of non-market behaviors, including
criminal law, civil rights, divorce and adoption. A few examples will serve to illustrate
the point. For positive and normative economic arguments in criminal law, see
DARYL A. HELLMAN & NEIL 0. ALPER, ECONOMICS OF CRIME: THEORY AND
PRACTICE (2d ed. 1990) and Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. PoL ECON. 169 (1968). For examples in civil rights, see GARY S.
BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DIsCIMINAION (2d ed. 1971) and John J. Donohue
III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. Ray. 1411 (1986). For arguments in family
law, see BECKER, FAMILY, supra note 4, and RICHARD A. POSNER, SEx AND REASON
3, 33-36, 85-88 (1992) [hereinafter POSNER, SEX AND REASON].
28. See Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J.
POL. EcoN. 385 (1993) [hereinafter Becker, Economic Way]. Posner notes that this
work has precedent in the work of Jeremy Bentham. See Posner, Uses and Abuses,
supra note 27, at 281-82.
29. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of
Law, 62 MINN. L. Rav. 1015 (1978) [hereinafter Michelman, Norms]. I share the
view that economics is generally more useful to law in its descriptive role than in its
normative manifestations. See Estin, Love and Obligation, supra note 3, at 1082-86,
30. See, e.g., POSNER, ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 16-18; Posner, Uses and Abuses, supra
note 27, at 284-87.
31. See Michelman, Norms, supra note 29, at 1038-40 ("we can carelessly slip from an
approximate empirical Is to a definite ideal Must or Ought to Be"); Baker, supra note
13, at 4-6 (arguing that Posner uses efficiency "as a normative, and not merely as a
technical standard").
32. See, e.g., TREBILCOCK, supra note 21, at 21-22; see also WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW
AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 4-10 (2d ed. 1988).
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normative bent of law and economics analysis may be inevitable, given
the highly normative character of our legal traditions.
33
One reason that the separation between positive and normative
analysis is difficult to maintain is that the language of "efficiency" figures
prominently in both. In positive analysis, "efficient" is a descriptive term,
denoting a utility-maximizing event or state of affairs.34 As a normative
guideline, "efficiency" is the economist's criterion for socially desirable
legal rules in a wide range of spheres.31 Frank Michelman suggests that
while positive economics applies pure efficiency norms, normative
analysis or "economic policy studies" are based on modified efficiency
criteria.36
In law and economics writing on family law, the confusion between
positive and normative theories is also apparent. Positive analysis, describ-
ing the perceived productive efficiencies of a traditional marital division
of labor based on gender,37 has generated a spate of normative work,
prescribing policy changes intended to protect and restore this type of
household.38 Other work, based on the descriptive premise that private
agreements are value-maximizing for the parties to the agreements, has
generated policy recommendations intended to remove courts from the
divorce process. 39 Throughout, although the touchstone of this writing
is "efficiency," it is often difficult to discern which meaning of the term
is operating.
33. See Posner, Uses and Abuses, supra note 27, at 285; see also Michelman, Norms, supra
note 29, at 1032.
34. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in
Law, 46 U. Cm. L. Ray. 307, 309 (1979) [hereinafter Michelman, Comment]; see
also Cooter, supra note 15, at 1263 ("A process is efficient when it yields the
maximum output from given input, or equivalently, when it yields a given output
with the minimum input.").
35. See POSNER, ANALYsis, supra note 1, at 13-16.
36. See Michelman, Norms, supra note 29, at 1032-35; see also Estin, Economics, supra
note 18, at 526-29 (arguing that different economic approaches to divorce reflect
different efficiency norms).
37. See generally Estin, Love and Obligation, supra note 3, at 1001-13.
38. See, e.g., ALLEN M. PARKmAN, No FAuLT DrVORCE: WHAT WET WRONG? (1992);
Severin Borenstein & Paul N. Courant, How to Carve a Medical Degree: Human
CapitalAssets in Divorce Settlements, 79 Am. ECON. REv. 992 (1989); Ira M. Ellman,
The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. Rav. 1 (1989); see also Becker, Finding Fault,
supra note 18.
39. See, e.g., Martin Zelder, Inefficient Dissolutions as a Consequence of Public Goods: The
Case of No-Fault Divorce, 22 J. LEAL STUD. 503 (1993); see also Becker, Finding
Fault, supra note 18.
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Further evidence, however, suggests that the two modalities of
economic reasoning have in fact been distinguished. Descriptive eco-
nomic accounts of family life have had significant influence on law, but
work that reflects the shift to a normative economic framework has not
been as warmly received.40 Prescriptive theories seem to be a tougher sell,
most likely because law responds to many competing normative visions
of the family.4 1 Ultimately, it appears that the claim to normative
authority draws the most fire from critics and keeps many legal theorists
at a cautious and skeptical distance from economic analysis.
B. Feminist Theory and Family Economics
Among feminist theorists, the responses to economic analysis seem
to range from moderate discomfort to deep hostility. At one end of the
spectrum there are a few writers who argue that feminist and economic
theories, properly understood, will often converge. 2 As Jana Singer
points out, economic analysis "seems to cohere with notions of formal
gender equality and the rejection of rigid gender roles.' 43 At the other
end of the spectrum, some feminist writers are deeply pessimistic,
criticizing the entire enterprise of economic research as presently consti-
tuted as unavoidably tainted by the broader system of gender oppres-
sion. 4
40. The influence of positive economic models is described in Milton C. Regan, Jr.,
Market Discourse and Moral Neutrality in Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 605,
626-59. For doubts as to the normative sufficiency of economic theory, see, for
example, Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral
Discourse, 1991 BYU L. Rav. 197, 217-27. My own work also falls into this
category. See Estin, Economics, supra note 18. See also the feminist writing on
economic approaches to divorce which is described in part I.B of this article.
41. Judge Posner has repeated in many settings his view that efficiency is not a sufficient
normative foundation for law. See, e.g., POSNER, ANALYsIs, supra note 1, at 27
("tT]here is more to justice than economics."). See also Kenneth E. Boulding,
Economics as a Moral Science, 59 Am. EcoN. Rav. 1 (1969).
42. See, e.g., TREBILCOCK, supra note 21, at 43-48; Richard A. Posner, Conservative Femi-
nism, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL. F. 191, 191-92 ("'[Clonservative feminism' ... is...
the idea that women are entitled to political, legal, social, and economic equality to
men, in the framework of a lightly regulated market economy."); Michael J.
Trebilcock & Rosemin Keshvani, The Role ofPrivate Ordering in Family Law: A Law
and Economics Perspective, 41 U. ToRorro L.J. 533, 553 (1991).
43. Singer, Alimony and Efflcieniy, supra note 10, at 2427.
44. See Wanda A. Wiegers, Economic Analysis of Law and 'Private Ordering. A Feminist
Critique, 42 U. ToRoNTo L.J. 170 (1992). As a number of writers have noted, many
of the differences between these poles echo the long-standing debate over "sameness"
[Vol. 4:1
1996] CAN FAMILIES BE EFFICIENT? A FEMINIST APPRAISAL 11
Between these two poles, a number of feminist scholars are inter-
ested in the insights and arguments that economic analysis can offer,
while remaining troubled by many of the assumptions and methods of
neoclassical economics.45 Writers in this group have pointed to a number
of variables that are normally omitted from economic investigation, but
which seem centrally important for understanding women's experiences
and concerns.16 At a minimum, feminist theorists agree that the subjects
of economic inquiry must be expanded to include the specific concerns
of women and the effects of gender on experience.47 Beyond this, some
feminist economists have begun to challenge the predominance of choice
theory, the paradigm of the rational, utility-maximizing individual agent,
and the heavily mathematical nature of contemporary economic theory.
4 8
For these writers, a feminist economics would require entirely new
models which do not dichotomize public and private life, which take
issues of gender and power into account, and which recognize empathy
and connection as well as self-interest and autonomy.
Unfortunately, we do not yet know much about how a feminist
economics would work: what new theoretical models it would employ;
what empirical methodologies it would develop; and what new informa-
tion and insights it would generate. 49 Most feminist economists work
within existing methods, exploring a range of important new questions
and also challenging the conclusions and policy implications of other
economic research. 50 Their work has led to valuable contributions on
important issues including women's wages and labor-force participation
51
and "difference" issues within feminism. See Marcia Neave, Resolving the Dilemma of
Difference: A Critique of 'The Role of Private Ordering in Family Law,' 44 U. TORON-
TO L.J. 97, 130-31 (1994); Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 42, at 535-37.
45. See, e.g., England, supra note 9, at 41-49; Singer, Alimony and Efficiency, supra note
10, at 2434-37, 2443-51; Strassman, supra note 9, at 56-63.
46. See Sawhill, supra note 4, at 120-24; sources cited supra note 45.
47. See generally Ferber & Nelson, supra note 9, at 2-7.
48. See generally BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 2.
49. See Rebecca M. Blank, What Should Mainstream Economists Learn from Feminist
Theory?, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 2, at 133, 136-38. One very helpful
source is JACOBSEN, supra note 1, which focuses on the economics of gender.
50. Ferber and Nelson refer to this group as "feminist empiricists." See Ferber & Nelson,
supra note 9, at 8; see also Blank, supra note 49, at 134.
51. See BERGMANN, supra note 9; see also Symposium, The Gender Gap in Compensation,
82 GEo. L.J. 27 (1993); FRANCINE D. BLAU & MARIANNE A. FERBER, THE EcONOM-
Ics oF WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK (1986); PAULA ENGLAND & GEORGE FARKAS,
HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT, AND GENDER (1986); Paula England, The Failure ofHu-
man Capital Theory to Evplain Occupational Sex Segregation, 17 J. HUM. RESOURCES
358 (1982).
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the economics of housework, child care, and non-market production,5 2
the control and distribution of income within households, 53 divorce, 54
and poverty.55 This work has encouraged the development of new main-
stream economic theories addressing household production and family
organization and bargaining.5'
Feminist analysis has led many writers to conclude that even positive
economic theory requires a new vision of the relationship between family
life and market behavior, and an elaboration of the interdependent effects
of gender in these two spheres.57 This implies new modes of description,
which can more adequately model the complexity of women's experience.
Thus, although mainstream theory depicts traditional gender-based family
roles (and the split between public and private life) as efficient, feminist
theorists have raised significant challenges to this view.5' For example,
Marianne Ferber and Bonnie Birnbaum have proposed a model that
addresses the present and future well-being of both husband and wife
rather than the total production of the household.59
52. See BERGMANN, supra note 9; WAMNG, supra note 9.
53. See Marjorie B. McElroy & Mary Jean Homey, Nash-Bargained Household Decisions:
Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand, 22 IN'L EcON. Rav. 333 (1981);
Marilyn Manser & Murray Brown, Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A
Bargaining Analysis, 21 INT'L EcoN. REv. 31 (1980).
54. See Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics ofAlimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1978); H.
Elizabeth Peters et al., Enforcing Divorce Settlements: Evidence from Child Support
Compliance and Award Modifications, 30 DEMOGRAPHy 719 (1993); H. Elizabeth
Peters, Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting, 76
AM. EcoN. Rnv. 437 (1986).
55. See generally JACOBSEN, supra note 1, at 59-61, 201-02.
56. Diana Strassman calls this a "mainstream fix." Strassman, supra note 9, at 63-64. For
a defense of the uses of traditional economic models in some settings, see Blank,
supra note 49, at 138-40.
57. See Hadfield, supra note 10, at 96-97; Neave, supra note 44, at 99, 109.
58. See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 10; Singer, Alimony and Efficiency, supra note 10, at
2440. Efforts have been made to correct for these problems within the theory, but
as Diana Strassman notes, the likelihood of achieving a "mainstream fix" depends on
whether the problems identified lie at the core or in the periphery of mainstream
economic theory. Strassman, supra note 9, at 63-65. Despite the advances of the new
home economics, the conceptual dichotomy between the public and private spheres
remains deeply embedded in economic thinking. Revising this aspect of economic
theory is a far more radical project, because it calls into question the dominant
economic paradigm of the market itself.
59. See Ferber & Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 26-27.
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C. Alimony and Divorce
At a normative level, there are points at which the feminist and
economic understandings of family life converge, both pointing toward
the same policy goals. While some legal commentators have sought to
abolish alimony,60 some feminist and economic theorists have sought to
expand it.61 Their agreement is clearest with the paradigm alimony case:
a long-term marriage, children, an older housewife with no recent em-
ployment experience, and a husband with a good career and substantial
earnings."2 Beyond this core, although both frameworks can be utilized
to advocate spousal support remedies in divorce, the analysis begins to
diverge.
Early discussions of alimony in the law and economics literature
were positivist, describing an economic rationale for alimony orders
under traditional, fault-based divorce regimes.63 More recent projects
have led to a normative argument for alimony awards and against no-
fault divorce regimes, based on a description of marriage and family life
that emphasizes the benefits of specialization of labor in the family, and
the costs in "human capital" terms that these arrangements often entail.'
As the economic accounts recognize, specialization within the family
has traditionally assumed clearly, divided gender roles. Although these
roles appear to be efficient during a marriage, they have put wives at
significantly greater risk in the event of divorce. Economists, in order to
protect the potential for gains from specialization in traditional marital
roles, have recommended that both alimony and property division be
structured to compensate for the greater investment that wives make in
such marriages, or that divorce should be restricted in order to protect
homemakers. 65
60. See, e.g., Louise B. Raggio, Don't Men Have Rights, Too?-Or Lifetime Alimonfi An
Idea Whose Time Has Come and Gone, in ALIMONY: NEW STRATEGIES FOR PURSUrr
AND DEFENSE 33 (Section of Family Law, American Bar Association ed., 1988).
61. Economic theorists advocating alimony remedies include PA xmtAN, supra note 38;
POSNER, ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 147-48; Landes, supra note 54. See also infra
notes 64-66. For feminist approaches, see infra notes 66-67.
62. See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 38, at 17; Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony and
the Rehabilitation ofFamily Care, 71 N.C. L. REv. 721, 745 n.84 (1993) [hereinafter
Estin, Family Care]. Some feminists are opposed to the continuation of alimony
remedies. See infra note 67.
63. See, e.g., POSNER, ANALYs s, supra note 1, at 147-48; Landes, supra note 54.
64. See, e.g., Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce and Quasi Rents; or, "I Gave Him the Best
Years ofMy Life," 16 J. LEAs. STUD. 267 (1987); Ellman, supra note 38.
65. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 64; Ellman, supra note 38; Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra
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Although feminist theorists do not generally share the goal of
propping up traditional marital roles, many feminists have supported the
goal of better financial remedies for women facing divorce. The econo-
mists' policy recommendations have therefore posed something of a
dilemma. Feminists recognize the ways in which the arguments behind
these proposals may be helpful to women who are now impoverished by
divorce. At the same time, they recoil at the heavily gendered nature of
the efficiency norms applied by economists." As Jana Singer describes
the problem, "the economic efficiency justification for alimony rests on
assumptions that are extremely troubling from the perspective of feminist
theory."67
There is also less agreement between feminist and economic theo-
rists on the goal of making divorce more difficult. Elimination of no-
fault divorce laws, to force spouses to bargain over the terms of divorce,
has been advocated by economists including Nobel laureate Gary S.
Becker.68 There have not been economic voices raised loudly in support
of the current regime. Among feminists, views of divorce law are more
divided, with a number of writers pointing out that fault-based divorce
was also a problem for women, or taking the view that restraining
women's access to divorce may be more problematic than the harms that
come from present divorce practices.69
These differences are closely tied to the criticisms that feminists have
made more generally concerning the "new home economics." 70 To the
note 42, at 549-58. The original positive economic explanation for alimony awards
is in Landes, supra note 54.
66. See Margaret E Brinig, Comment on Jana Singer's Alimony and Efficiency, 82 GEo.
L.J. 2461 (1994); June Carbone, Economics, Feminism and the Reinvention ofAlimony:
A Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1463 (1990); Singer, Alimony andEfficiency,
supra note 10, at 2434-37.
67. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency, supra note 10, at 2424. There are also feminist
theorists who oppose the institution of alimony. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, Equality
and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L.
Rev. 1, 80-89 (1987) [hereinafter Kay, Equality and Difference]. But see Herma Hill
Kay, Commentary: Toward a Theory of Fair Distribution, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 755,
763-65 (1991).
68. See Becker, Finding Fault, supra note 18; see also PARKmAN, supra note 38; Zelder,
supra note 39.
69. See, e.g., Kay, Equality and Difference, supra note 67; Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory Mar-
riage "For the Sake of the Children" A Feminist Reply to Elizabeth Scott, 66 TUL. L.
REv. 1435 (1992); Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L.
REv. 1103 (1989) [hereinafter Singer, Divorce Reform].
70. See sources cited supra notes 8-10.
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extent that the efficiency of traditional roles is a function of gender
norms that remain unexamined, or worse, of factors such as discrimina-
tion against women in the marketplace, the analysis is circular and
unpersuasive.71 Moreover, even without considering the effects of dis-
crimination against women, it is not clear that traditional gender-based
household roles are "efficient." As a number of feminist writers have
pointed out, the "economic approach" to the family has ignored empiri-
cal evidence suggesting that wives often bear much heavier loads of work
and family responsibility than their husbands. 72 Conversely, as Gillian
Hadfield has argued, economists' failure to question the structure of
gender roles in the family has led to models of labor markets that ignore
serious efficiency problems.
73
Singer, in an analysis of the "efficiency" arguments for alimony,
points out that even if household specialization were efficient, feminists
would be concerned about the link between specialization and gender
inequality both within the family and in the larger society. 4 She points
out that traditional household roles have also been the source of signifi-
cant problems for women. These include the perpetuation of gender-
based inequality and power differentials in the wider society,75 and the
problems generated in divorce when a wife bears a disproportionate share
of the costs which may have made these roles "efficient" in the pre-
divorce family.76 While the economic approach suggests that alimony
should compensate some of these costs, the particular remedies these
71. See Carbone, supra note 66, at 1490-91; Hadfield, supra note 10, at 96. As Gillian
Hadfield argues, to the extent that economists explain the "gender gap" in wages as
a result of women's greater responsibilities at home, the analysis has not established
that this organization of work is efficient. See Hadfield, supra note 10, at 96.
72. See, e.g., Brinig, supra note 66, at 2469-73; Carbone, supra note 66, at 1485-88;
Hadfield, supra note 10, at 97-98; Singer, Alimony and Effciency, supra note 10, at
2440. This suggests the possibility that the division of labor is achieved by the male
household head by exploitation rather than by altruism. See Hadfield, supra note 10,
at 98. At the very least, the data suggest that household heads do not act altruistically
in the allocation of the more unpleasant aspects of household work. See BERGMANN,
supra note 9; see aho Mary Ann Case, OfRichard Epstein and Other Radical Feminists,
18 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 369, 390-92 (1995).
73. See Hadfield, supra note 10, at 97 (calling for more attention to the interconnections
between family and market life).
74. See Singer, Alimony and Effciency, supra note 10, at 2440-41.
75. See Singer, Alimony and Eff ciency, supra note 10, at 2441.
76. See Singer, Alimony and Efficiency, supra note 10, at 2441-42; see aho Estin, Family
Care, supra note 62, at 780-81.
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writers have suggested are clearly less than complete.' Given the poten-
tial harm to women in our society from household specialization, Singer
asks whether it is sensible to "encourage women to abandon their careers
... in exchange for a promise to 'hold them harmless' financially in the
event of divorce."7
8
Picking up on several of these themes, Margaret Brinig explores in
more detail the assumptions on which the economic theory is based,
identifying a number of these which give feminist theorists reason to be
cautious.79 Brinig emphasizes a number of ways in which family life is
more complex than the economic models allow: marital decisions generate
substantial externalities because they affect children,80 and these decisions
are not easily reversed at the time of divorce.8' Brinig also questions the
assumption in the mainstream theory that the division of labor must
occur only between husband and wife, because this ignores the possibility
that other individuals may perform household work. Furthermore, she
challenges the assumption that there are always increasing returns to scale
from additional hours 6f home or market production. 8
2
77. As Singer notes, the theory attempts to specify both a justification for alimony in
general and a method for computing particular awards. See Singer, Alimony and
Efficiency, supra note 10, at 2441. See also Cohen, supra note 64, at 303; Ellman,
supra note 38. In these formulas, however, factors such as the wife's "loss in mar-
riageability" or emotional distress are typically excluded. See Estin, Economics, supra
note 18, at 567.
78. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency, supra note 10, at 2442 (quoting June Carbone, Eco-
nomics, Feminism & the Reinvention ofAlimony: A Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L.
REv. 1465, 1493 (1990)). This is a theme many others have sounded. See, e.g.,
Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its
Aftermath, 56 U. GIN. L. REv. 1, 80 (1987); see also Estin, Family Care, supra note
62, at 778 n.215, 800 n.314 (noting a shift in position by Kay and others who have
addressed this point).
79. See Brinig, supra note 66, at 2470-73.
80. See Brinig, supra note 66, at 2463; see also Carbone, supra note 66, at 1488-89.
81. See Brinig, supra note 66, at 2465. As she points out, there is more than one "deal"
to be considered in any marriage, and alimony makes much greater sense in some
settings than others. Brinig, supra note 66, at 2466-68.
82. See Margaret E Brinig, The Law and Economics ofNo-Fault Divorce-A Review ofNo-
Fault Divorce: What Went Wrong?, 26 FAm. L.Q. 453, 456-57 (1993) (book review).
In addition, she notes that the analysis may fail to take into account various psychic
costs for women and men that result from specialization. See Brinig, supra, at 457-58.
Ferber and Birnbaum also develop this point. See Ferber & Birnbaum, supra note 4,
at 23. Along the same lines, June Carbone has argued that a model based on
maximizing household income neglects other goods, such as the "psychic satisfaction"
of employment or parenthood, and the prestige and security of economic indepen-
dence. See Carbone, supra note 66, at 1488-89.
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Feminist writers have proposed different rationales for alimony,
which would recognize the economic effects of household specialization
on women without fostering sharply delineated gender roles. June
Carbone describes a restitution-based system, which she believes would
both "encourage[ ] women to look to their own earnings rather than to
marriage for their financial security,"83 and "encourage women to
continue to bear the primary responsibility for childrearing and to make
sacrifices that will enhance their husbands' careers."8" Singer proposes an
income sharing approach that would "combine the equal partnership
ideal that underlies current equitable division schemes with the econo-
mist's recognition of enhancements in human capital as the most valu-
able asset produced during most marriages."85 Singer argues that this
approach could help "to diminish existing power disparities during
marriage," and would "encourage husbands to increase their investment
in family care."86 Joan Williams, who also recommends income equal-
ization after divorce, would go further. She argues for new entitlements
in property, so that both husband and wife would have equal claims to
wages that either earns during the time their children are dependent and
for a considerable period after divorce.87
The differences between feminist and economic approaches to
alimony are subtle but significant. If the goal of divorce remedies is to
foster "efficiency" within marriage, alimony is important only in those
cases in which a significant economic event has occurred. These would
include the case in which one partner has increased his or her "human
capital" by acquiring a diploma or professional license,88 and the case in
which one partner has suffered a decrease in market-based human capital
by devoting time to childrearing.8 9 While these cases can be stated in
83. Carbone, supra note 66, at 1493.
84. Carbone, supra note 66, at 1493. Carbone describes Ellman's alimony theory, see
infra notes 88-90, as a restitutionary system consistent with her own approach. She
argues, however, that if the objective of alimony is to foster traditional household
labor division, paying alimony as a form of expectation damages to wives would be
most appropriate. See Carbone, supra note 66, at 1495.
85. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency, supra note 10, at 2454.
86. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency, supra note 10, at 2455.
87. See Williams, supra note 6, at 2257-66.
88. For example, see Ellman, supra note 38, at 68-71, although he would limit alimony
in this case to the amount of the other spouse's lost earning capacity. Many econo-
mists prefer property division remedies in this situation. See, e.g., PARaCuN, supra
note 38, at 130-32; Borenstein & Courant, supra note 38.
89. See, Ellman, supra note 38, at 71-73.
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gender neutral terms, many economists presume that traditional gender
roles are more efficient, because of women's "comparative advantage" in
reproductive activities.90 These are also relatively easy cases, in which
arguments could be made on a wide range of grounds.91
The economic approach does not seem to support alimony in a
number of other situations, such as the case in which parties have a
premarital or separation agreement excluding alimony,92 the case of a
relatively short marriage or one in which there had not been much
specialization of labor,93 the case in which there was a specialization of
labor but no significant human capital changes during the marriage,94 or
the case in which the partnei who would have an alimony claim is the
one seeking a divorce. 5 Indeed, these present much more difficult
normative problems, on which our current practice is often divided.
While the specific recommendations of feminist legal theorists are
often similar to those of their law and economics counterparts, their
approach to these alimony cases is quite different. Feminist analysis has
devoted much greater attention to the pool of income and property
interests of a married couple, and has sought to redefine these as shared
rather than separate.96 It has also been less concerned with the project of
measuring the contributions or losses of each partner, or specifying the
particular form that families should take.9 7 Feminists have emphasized
90. On comparative advantage in reproductive activities, see BEcKan, FAMILY, supra note
4, at 38-41. Ellman designs his theory to address "economically rational marital
sharing behavior" rather than traditional gender roles. See Elman, supra note 38, at
48-49. He notes, however, that because of social mores, wives' noneconomic losses
from divorce are generally more severe than husbands'. See Ellman, supra note 38, at
43-44, 80-81.
91. See generally, Schneider, supra note 40, at 246-47 ("The force of the paradigm case
largely arises from the personal and moral relationship between the husband and
wife.").
92. See Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 42, at 542-45. But see PAR mN, supra note
38, at 97-98.
93. For Ellman, this includes most childless marriages. See Ellman, supra note 38, at
63-66.
94. See, e.g., PARxmm, supra note 38, at 133-34, 137; Ellman, supra note 38, at 66-71.
95. Ellman would recognize an alimony claim in this situation. See Ellman, supra note
38, at 56. But other economists who advocate mutual consent divorce rules, would
require the spouse seeking a divorce to bargain with the other over terms. See
PARKmAN, supra note 38, at 137-40; Becker, Finding Fault, supra note 18. For a
housewife who wants out, this would often mean forfeiting any alimony award. See
generally Estin, Economics, supra note 18, at 533-50.
96. See Singer, Divorce Reform, supra note 69, at 1113-21; Williams, supra note 6.
97. See Estin, Family Care, supra note 62, at 781-91.
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support for ongoing care for children and their caregivers in marriage,
after divorce, and in non-marital families, rather than seeking compensa-
tion for the "lost opportunities" that caring for children may represent.9"
They are also more likely to look for solutions to the public sector,
rather than conceptualizing family matters as a purely private affair.99
The economic and feminist approaches to divorce are also divergent.
Economists have argued for an end to unilateral no-fault divorce laws,'
and for greater privatization of the divorce process. 1 ' The theoretical
basis for these policy recommendations is that no-fault divorce laws allow
inefficient divorces, defined in this literature as divorces in which al-
though one individual may gain from the divorce, the parties' combined
gain from divorce is less than their combined gain from remaining
married. To address this problem, economists have advocated mutual
consent rules, which would force the spouse seeking a divorce to bargain
with the other over compensation for his or her anticipated losses.'0 2
Although feminist writers have also criticized the effects of no-fault
divorce, they have not sought to abolish it. Some have argued that
women did not fare appreciably better under the former laws.0 3 Others
have focused on the need for divorce in a number of specific situations
that many women confront, particularly when one spouse is abusive, 10 4
or in the situation in which a woman undergoes fundamental personal
changes after her marriage that lead her to question or reject more
traditional marital roles.10 5
Some economists have claimed common ground with feminist
theorists on the question of divorce policy, highlighting the points at
98. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY,
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing
Single Parents, 18 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 19 (1995); Estin, Family Care, supra note 62,
at 781-802.
99. Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the
Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORcE REFORM AT THE CROSS-
ROADS 191 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
100. See, e.g., PARmAN, supra note 38; Becker, Finding Fault, supra note 18, at 22;
Zelder, supra note 39.
101. See, e.g., Becker, Deadbeat Dads, supra note 18, at 18. See generally Jana B. Singer,
The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1443 [hereinafter Singer,
Privatization].
102. See, e.g., PARKmAN, supra note 38; Becker, Finding Fault, supra note 18, at 22;
Zelder, supra note 39. See generally Estin, Economics, supra note 18, at 533-50.
103. See, e.g., Singer, Divorce Reform, supra note 69.
104. See Lacey, supra note 69, at 1443-46.
105. See Lacey, supra note 69, at 1446-48.
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which the two approaches have converged."0 6 These accounts do not
acknowledge that in many contexts, economics appears to lead to
significantly different answers than a feminist analysis would suggest. The
divergence begins with the radically different positive frameworks and
methods on which the two approaches depend.
II. METHODOLOGY: THREE PROBLEMS
This section considers a series of methodological problems with the
positive economic analysis of households. The first problem addressed is
that the process of describing household labor in economic terms requires
"valuing" it based on comparisons between labor in the household and
in the market. Accurate valuations are impossible, however, because work
in the home is structured entirely differently from work in the market,
and because gender-based disparities affect the meaning and value
accorded to work in both contexts. Second, applying the descriptive
methods of economics to the family has proceeded from the assumption
that exchange and market metaphors and the concepts of rational choice
and utility-maximization are a sufficient language for speaking about the
family. Feminist theories suggest that a wider range of conceptions is
required. A third problem results from the first two: when the descriptive
theory is used as a basis for prescriptive, normative pronouncements
about what is "efficient" in family life, it requires that every aspect of
family life be subject to this dual process of valuation and exchange. This
prospect raises troubling commodification concerns, and tests severely the
premises of economic analysis in this setting.
A. Making Comparisons
Because most household work takes place outside the market, it is
largely ignored in economic theory and policy-making. Feminist scholars
in a number of disciplines have written about this problem, pointing out
that the traditional exclusion of nonmarket work from economic analysis
creates substantial policy distortions, many of which are heavily
gendered. 107 For mainstream economists, where no profits are produced,
106. See e.g., PARKMAN, supra note 38, at 116-20; Martin Zelder, The Economic Analysis
of the Effect ofNo-Fault Divorce Law on the Divorce Rate, 16 HA. v. J.L. & PuB. PO.'Y
241, 260-62 (1993).
107. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUsTIcE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 204 n.48 (1989);
WARING, supra note 9, at 36-43; see also MARGARET G. REID, ECONOMICS OF
HOUSEHOLD PRODUcnON (1934).
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an activity is not productive. Marilyn Waring gives a wonderful example:
a woman who supplies the labor of childbirth is not thought to be
performing work or engaged in production, unless she is a paid surro-
gate. At the same time, a midwife, nurse, doctor or anesthetist in
attendance at the birth is engaged in work.'08 By the same token, argues
Waring, "growing and processing food, nurturing, educating, and
running a household-all part of the complex process of reproduc-
tion-are unacknowledged as part of the production system."109
As economists have sought to include household production in their
models, they have faced an obvious and immediate problem. Because the
economic value of work is defined by the wages paid for it in the
market, work that is not performed for a price has no measurable value.
There are a number of solutions to this problem, all of which are based
on comparisons between work in the home and work in established labor
markets."0 This type of comparison is made regularly in tort litigation
involving injury or death to a homemaker. In this setting, an expert
economist testifies as to what it would cost to purchase various house-
hold services on the market"' or as to what the homemaker's time was
worth in the market place." 2
In order to value household services or a homemaker's time, an
economist must find an appropriate point of comparison in the market.
Can a homemaker's services be "replaced" with a minimum wage
domestic worker, or should the comparison be to a teacher, chef, or
nurse? Should the computation include the costs of fringe benefits, such
as worker's compensation insurance, that would be paid for a market
employee? If the homemaker works more than forty hours in a week,
should the figures include overtime pay? And, if she performs several
tasks simultaneously, should the computation give credit for them
108. WARING, supra note 9, at 27-28.
109. WARING, supra note 9, at 28.
110. This is not done as a general matter in computing various economic indicators,
although there have been efforts to change the practice. See the Unremunerated
WorkAct, H.R. 966, 103rd Cong. § 3 (1993), and the Economic EqualityAct, H.R.
2790, 103rd Cong. § 803 (1993), sponsored by Rep. Barbara Rose-Collins (D.
Mich.), which would have required that gross national product be computed to
include the value of unremunerated work including household work and child care.
Gary Becker has supported this type of change. See Gary S. Becker, Housework: The
Missing Piece ofthe Economic Pie, Bus. WK., October 16, 1995, at 30.
111. This is usually described as a "replacement cost" measure of the housewife's value.
112. This is usually described as an opportunity cost approach. See generally POSNR,
ANL.Ysis, supra note 1, at 192-93.
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separately? In practice, when these valuations are performed in tort
actions, the comparisons are typically limited to a few basic services,
those performed by individuals with wages among the lowest in the
marketplace.113
Similar issues arise with the alternative method of computation,
which asks what the homemaker would be paid if she sold her labor in
the market. Here as well, forensic experts often conclude that a home-
maker could only find a relatively unskilled or low-paid position in the
labor force, which suggests an equally low value for her household work.
More sophisticated economic theory goes a few steps beyond this
analysis, pointing out that the market price reflects the lowest possible
value for her time, and arguing that it would be more accurate to look
at what the homemaker would be earning if she had had the opportunity
to invest in the types of skills, training and experience that are more
highly valued in the job market." 4 This approach has been resisted in
forensic circles, however, perhaps because it seems almost impossibly
speculative, beyond what our personal injury damages rules can tolerate.
Both of these models incorporate into their valuation methods the
lower values accorded by the market to women as workers and to the
work of women. As feminist economists have elaborated in some detail,
gender issues permeate the labor market. 1 5 If we use the market as a
point of comparison, we bring all of these problems into the economic
description of the household. Not surprisingly, tort recoveries for house-
wives who are injured or killed are far lower than those for wage earn-
ers.
116
This is a real dilemma. Any approach which uses the market prices
of women's work and women workers to set the value of household labor
does not move us very far beyond the view that women's work does not
really count. The feminist literature in economics suggests that the prob-
lem of value in the market and value in the home is the same problem:
a large portion of the "gender gap" between men's and women's wages
relates directly to the greater burdens of family work and caregiving
borne by women.11 7 As Hadfield points out, there is a close relationship
113. See Neil K. Komesar, Toward a General Theory of Personal Injury Loss, 3 J. LEGAL
STuD. 457, 480-83 (1974).
114. See POSNER, ANiA.Ysis, supra note 1, at 193.
115. For an outstanding elaboration of these issues, see BERGMANN, supra note 9.
116. See Estin, Love and Obligation, supra note 3, at 1023-35.
117. Victor Fuchs, in his book Women's Quest for Economic Equality, notes that white
married women in their forties earn only 85% of what their unmarried counterparts
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between the structure of labor in the market and the household. To the
extent that differences between men and women in labor markets are
based on women's different burdens of family responsibility, most
economists see no normative problem, and no lack of efficiency. Hadfield
argues that this is because they have not explored very fully either the
positive or normative aspects of the typical household division of labor:
Although we have numerous theories of how the labor market
contributes to the gender gap, economists have essentially only
one theory of why the household is organized as it is. And
because this theory concludes that the organization of the
household is efficient, there has been no stimulus for econo-
mists, wedded to efficiency as a normative criterion, to explore
with positive theory the impact that policies aimed at restruc-
turing the traditional household might have on the wage
gap.
118
While recognizing that the mainstream theory has led to valuable
insights, she argues that there is a need to devise richer alternative
theories." 9 Hadfield recommends that positive economic theory should
begin to investigate "what creates and sustains the traditional division of
labor in the household." 120
B. Exchange Metaphors
The "economic model" of family behavior begins with the assertion
that individuals decide whether to marry, have children, or divorce based
on a comparison of the direct and indirect benefits and costs of different
actions. It conceives of people in family relations as rational, utility-
maximizing actors, facing a range of choices with limited supplies of
time, energy, wealth and other resources. It imagines that for most goods
earn per hour of work. VicrOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QuST Pop ECONOMIC EQUAL-
irT 59 (1988). He emphasizes that there are many reasons why married women's
family responsibilities lead to lower wages, including: time taken out of the labor
market for pregnancy, childbirth and child-rearing; constrained job choices in order
to achieve flexibility required for child-care; more absences from work, and a reduced
investment in their own "human capital," starting even before marriage and child-
rearing begin. See FUCHS, supra, at 60-64.
118. Hadfield, supra note 10, at 89.
119. See Hadfield, supra note 10, at 96-98.
120. Hadfield, supra note 10, at 103. As Professor Hadfield notes, this is an area in which
feminist legal theory may be useful to economists. See Hadfield, supra note 10, at
103.
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there are substitutes, although recognizing that these may not be perfect,
and postulates that individual actors have an ability to choose freely.
One set of difficulties has arisen as theorists seek to analyze behavior
in families with models developed to explore behavior of individuals
dealing at arm's length. One approach has been to treat each "family" as
if it were an individual, that is, an economic actor with a single utility
function. Viewed historically, this approach suggests the common law
spousal unity doctrine, which treated husband and wife as one legal
person. It is problematic for many reasons, not least of which is that it
excludes from analysis all of the interactions that occur within house-
holds and between family members. Another approach is to ignore the
family entity, and direct the analysis toward the behavior of individuals.
Yet treating each family member as an independent utility-maximizer
misses something as well, because it does not help us to understand how
individuals in relationships with other individuals make decisions.
This problem has been explored by Gary Becker in a theory con-
cerning altruism and its effects on allocations of resources within fami-
lies."' His model describes how an altruistic head of a household can
allocate resources in a manner to ensure cooperation and maximize the
preferences of all family members. Some economists criticize this model
because it also effectively ignores what occurs within families, and it has
been particularly objectionable for feminists. Diana Strassman calls this
model "The Story of the Benevolent Patriarch," and points out that the
model ignores the effects of power: the household head is assumed to be
the husband and father, who is in a position of control because he owns
the financial resources entering the household. 2 Feminists point out that
male household heads do not always behave altruistically, and in addi-
tion, that the model ignores the altruistic behavior of relatively powerless
family members. 123 Another strand of economic theory treats the family
as a type of "firm," and concentrates on understanding and elaborating
the process and structure of family economic decision-making. This
model recognizes that family members have different access to financial
and other resources, which translates into different abilities to bargain
within marriage and in the event of divorce. 124 Bargaining models
121. See BECKR, FAMILY, supra note 4, at 277-306.
122. Strassman, supra note 9, at 58-59; see also England, supra note 9, at 47-48.
123. This type of contribution has always been difficult to capture in legal and economic
norms. See Estin, Love and Obligation, supra note 3, at 1013-22.
124. See Ferber & Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 26-27. The pioneering work in this area
was done by Manser & Brown, supra note 53, and McElroy & Homey, supra note
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envision marriage as a cooperative process that is always influenced by
the parties' awareness of what their opportunities would be outside of the
marriage if the marriage were to fail. Where one spouse has relatively
more attractive opportunities in the event of divorce, this fact will
translate into greater power within marriage. Thus, this analysis leads us
directly to questions of real concern for feminist legal theory. It permits
us to investigate how women's social and economic opportunities and
their legal entitlements affect their power within marriage. Once again,
it leads us to consider the question Hadfield poses: what is it that creates
and sustains the traditional division of labor in the household?'
Market metaphors and exchange rhetoric have some significant
precedents in family law, which has long used a contract metaphor to
describe marriage. One reason that family law has proved to be a suc-
cessful location for economic analysis is that our understandings of
marriage, divorce, and child-rearing are increasingly exchange-based." 6
The scope for operation of contract principles has broadened substan-
tially, and family law doctrines are increasingly inclined to view most
aspects of family life as purely private."7 At the same time, this revolu-
tion is not complete, and there is still significant discomfort evident in
judicial opinions and academic literature which resist treating marriage
"as a business arrangement."'' 2
8
53. Viewing the family as a firm, some economists have described the gains that
occur from cooperative behavior among family members, especially over the long
term. See, e.g., Douglas W. Allen, An Inquiry into the State's Role in Marriage, 13 J.
EcoN. BEIHAV. & ORG. 171 (1990); Yoram Ben-Porath, The F-Connection: Families,
Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange, 6 POPULATION & DEa. Rv. 1
(1980); Arthur B. Cornell, Jr., When Two Become One, and Then Come Undone: An
Organizational Approach to Marriage and Its Implications for Divorce Law, 26 FAm.
L.Q. 103 (1992). Others have theorized about how the coordination process occurs,
and how different bargaining endowments lead to different results. See, e.g., Margaret
F. Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal Rules and
Transactions Costs, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsoL. 279 (1993); Shelly Lundberg &
Robert A. Pollak, Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market, 101 J. PoL.
EcoN. 988 (1993).
125. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
126. See generally Regan, supra note 40 (discussing, in part, why the economic model of
the family resonates with modern experience).
127. See generally Singer, Privatization, supra note 101 (arguing that, within family law,
private norms and private decisions have replaced rules and structures imposed by the
state).
128. Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71
N.C. L. RaV. 721, 765 (1993) (citing Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 533
(N.J. 1982)); see also Estin, supra, at 764-67.
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The exchange approach to family life is problematic for a number
of reasons. The first, and most traditional, concerns the protective
function of family law. Historically, this was implemented with rules
based on family status rather than contract principles. 129 Status relation-
ships were not an unmitigated good for women, but they have certain
advantages. Along with any contract-based regime come a variety of
problems that economists describe as contracting failures, including
fraud, duress, and overreaching or problems that result from the more
subtle effects of unequal bargaining power and close family relationships.
For feminist theorists, these power issues are at the core of the objection
to contractual regulation of intimate relations. 30 A second related
question is whether the economists' contract models, based on rational
maximizing behavior, adequately describe or explain relations in the
family. Feminist critics often emphasize the harsher aspects of family
behavior and the presence of many types of force or coercion directed at
women both inside and outside the family.' 3' To the extent that gender
roles are the result of physical force or social coercion, it is not plausible
to conclude that relations in the family are the product of contract or
exchange within the terms of these models. A third problem is that, if
we accept the bargaining view of family relations, we encounter the same
valuation problems discussed above. Barbara Bergmann points out that
bargaining within a marriage reflects a "market ethic," in which time
"trades" at its market price. If a husband's household time is valued at
his higher market rate, his lesser contribution to housework counts for
more than his wife's more substantial efforts. 32 Similarly, Marianne
Ferber and Bonnie Birnbaum argue that the relative financial contribu-
tions that husband and wife make to the family determine how status
and power are allocated within the household.133
Historically, there has been a strong appeal for some feminists in the
idea of remaking the family on market terms. This has led to arguments
129. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAw AND THE PuRsurr OF ImiAcv 34-35
(1993); see also Estin, Love and Obligation, supra note 3, at 1046-52.
130. See, e.g., Neave, supra note 44; Weigers, supra note 44.
131. There is a large feminist literature on violence directed at women within families. See
LINDA GOION, HEROES OF THEIR OW N LIVES 250-88 (1988); LENORE E. WALKER,
THE BATrERED WOMAN (1979); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence ofPrivacy, 23
CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991); see also sources cited infra note 146.
132. See BERGMANN, supra note 9, at 266-73. In economic logic, this seems to "explain"
the anomaly of the efficient household in which women work more hours than men.
See supra note 71.
133. See Ferber & Birnbaum, supra note 4, at 22-23.
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for the reinvention of housework on an "industrial" model, or for the
integration of women's household labor into the market economy. 34 At
times, an argument has been made to require wages for housework.' 35
Other feminist writers have argued that the structure of the family and
market spheres make it impossible to bring the two together in this
way. 13
6
Finally, the exchange models of family interaction are especially
problematic when we wish to consider children's interests. An analysis
that assumes that family behaviors are motivated by altruism is clearly
inadequate to help explain and address the failures of altruism in fami-
lies.'37 Also, models based on exchange must take into account the
powerlessness of most children. Some of the economic literature, in-
cluding writing by Gary Becker, explores the barriers that prevent
children from contracting directly with their parents.' 3 Because of these
difficulties, economists commonly treat children's interests as a type of
"external effect" of parental bargaining, and describe the law as regulating
these effects through rules governing abuse and neglect, custody and
support, and historically, the availability of divorce. 39 Much of the
bargaining analysis is based on an assumption that at least one parent,
usually the mother, will incorporate the children's best interests into that
parent's own bargaining position. So far, however, the literature has not
explored in much detail what effects this would have on that parent's
ability to negotiate.14
0
134. In the last century, proposals for the "industrialization of housework" referred to the
new science of home economics. See SUSAN STRASSER, NEVER DONE 202-23 (1982).
Today, the phrase is more likely to refer to purchasing prepared food, day care, or
housecleaning services in the market. See, e.g., BERGMAN'N, supra note 9, at 275-98.
135. See BERGMANN, supra note 9, at 209-12; Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497, 1539 (1983).
A different proposal would define both partners in a marriage as equal owners of all
wages earned by either partner. See Williams, supra note 6 (arguing that a single
income in a traditional household represents the labor of two people, and proposing
that women who provide a household with domestic labor receive a portion of their
husbands' salaries as an entitlement).
136. See generally CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SExuAL CoNTRACT (1988); Okin, supra note
107, at 181; Olsen, supra note 135.
137. See Estin, Love and Obligation, supra note 3, at 1074-81.
138. See Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, The Family and the State, 31 J.L. & ECON.
1 (1988).
139. See Becker & Murphy, supra note 138; see also POSNER, ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at
149-57.
140. For a rare example, see Brinig & Alexeev, supra note 124. See also ELEANOR E.
MAcCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOIUN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL
DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY (1992).
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An alternative approach in the economic literature conceives of
children not as participants but as one of the goods produced by mar-
riage and bargained over in divorce." This writing often focuses on
money-custody trades, or explores the connections between child support
and visitation.142 But the children-as-goods approach risks treating them
as merely an expensive commodity, and it raises serious concerns analo-
gous to the concerns of many feminists with surrogacy and prostitution.
That is, economic writing on the family, which alternates between
models that define children as either members of a family or as goods
produced by a family, demonstrates the inadequacy of these models.
Children are central to the economic description of the family.
Economists describe the purpose of marriage as the rearing of children,
the type of household production which seems to require a gender-based
specialization of labor is childrearing, and the harms identified in eco-
nomic writing on divorce concern women with children who are left
with inadequate financial support. In most of the analysis, however,
children are externalized, commodified, or their interests are simply
collapsed together with the interests of mothers.143
C Commodification
One risk of the use of market rhetoric is that it will be taken
literally rather than metaphorically. What matters most about family life
is not commodified: it cannot be bought and sold, and cannot be valued
in money. This social reality creates problems for all but the most
theoretical economic analysis, for although most family economists speak
in terms of "utility" rather than money, the models they have used have
depended upon the universal "measuring rod of money." '144
141. See e.g., Yoram Weiss & Robert J. Willis, Children as Collective Goods and Divorce
Settlements, 3 J. LAB. ECON. 268 (1985); Zelder, supra note 39, at 505.
142. See, e.g., Weiss & Willis, supra note 141; Zelder, supra note 39.
143. See, e.g., BECKER, FAMILY, supra note 4, at 37-38 and 375-76; POSNEI, ANALYSIS,
supra note 1, at 143-44; Allen M. Parkman, Reform of the Divorce Provisions of the
Marriage Contract, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 91, 104 (1994). This practice also has some
currency in feminist writing, but its usefidness for women may be questioned: To
what extent does it operate to justify the increasingly tenuous relationships between
divorced fathers and their children, and the unequal burdens mothers are expected
to assume after divorce?
144. Coase, supra note 15, at 209. As Margaret Radin argues, our legal discourse reflects
this problem in the conflict over tort remedies for nonpecuniary harms. Economic
theories of corrective justice depict the process as one in which harms to persons are
compensated by the payment of money damages, suggesting that harms and dollars
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This is difficult enough if we are only concerned with housework,
but when we understand "household labor" to include the entire spec-
trum of human reproduction and family life, the market paradigm raises
troubling issues of its commodification. Feminists have been concerned
with the commodification of women's reproductive capacities (surroga-
cy)145 and sexual capacities (rape, prostitution, and pornography). 14 6
Much of the current law and economics analysis of the family treats
children explicitly as commodities "produced" by the family from a
variety of monetary and nonmonetary inputs,' 47 or treats children implic-
itly as commodities in the context of divorce bargaining.
148
Economic models which treat family choices as if various goods were
commensurable have allowed testing of hypotheses which produce
interesting insights. It is not clear, however, that economic theory can
move from these descriptive and explanatory contributions to policy
proposals without creating serious problems of commodification. Once
economists begin to prescribe certain policies on efficiency grounds, the
analysis no longer simply treats various goods as if they could be substi-
tuted or exchanged in implicit, market-like transactions. To base family
policy on efficiency norms is actually to promote exchange relations
within the family, requiring the explicit commodification of whatever
goods are subject to the policies.
In divorce law, the prospect of "money for custody" bargains, as
well as aspects of property division and alimony, raise this concern.
Although various property division divorce statutes speak of taking into
account the contributions of both husband and wife to a marriage, the
prospect of actually trying to list and measure them all has been stead-
fastly resisted. Judges deciding these cases typically presume that the
wife's and husband's contributions have in fact been equal. In those cases
can be ranked on a single scale. See Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and
Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1849 (1987) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalien-
ability].
145. See, e.g., MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988); PATEMAN, supra note
136, at 209-18; Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 144, at 1925-26; Debra
Satz, Markets in Women's Reproductive Labor, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107 (1992).
146. On rape, see, for example, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TowARD A FEMINIST THEO-
RY OF THE STATE 171-83 (1989); Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 144, at
1879-81. On pornography, see, for example, MACKINNON, supra, at 195-214. On
prostitution, see, for example, PATEMAN, supra note 136, at 189-209; Radin, Market-
Inalienability, supra note 144, at 1921-25.
147. See, e.g., POSNR, ANALYSIS, supra note 1.
148. See, e.g., Zelder, supra note 39.
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in which a court feels compelled to notice a significant inequality, there
is often a disclaimer attached: marriage is just not about keeping track
of each party's debits and credits. 4 ' Judges have also resisted, in most
jurisdictions outside New York, the argument for defining and valuing
a marital property interest in one spouse's professional degree or li-
cense. 1
50
These trends have contradicted the economic theories addressing
divorce that have urged much greater use of remedies that would com-
pensate for gains and losses in human capital. Despite the scholarly
attention that has been brought to this question, it is not apparent that
such measurements are possible, and it is even less clear that such a
process would be worth the commodification risks it would entail.15'
There are certainly other possibilities: looking to the tort analogy, one
could explore the possibility of social insurance schemes rather than
direct financial remedies. 152 Or we might prefer rules which seek to
recognize wrongs done and provide redress without attempting to rectify
them. This might involve defining formulas for payments in the event
of divorce, such as child support guidelines or income-splitting spousal
support awards, which do not require us to "value" individuals in dollars
and cents.
These three problems-of making comparisons between production
in the family and the market, of using exchange metaphors to model
family relationships, and ofcommodifying family life-all complicate the
positive economic analysis of families, and prevent it from generating the
sort of testable hypotheses and solid data that are the hallmark of
economic analysis in other contexts. Here, the effort to reduce the
complexity of social life to the elegant abstractions of theory requires
eliminating too much. The project can succeed only if a set of normative
judgments is admitted into the analysis at a very early stage. Thus, the
descriptive analysis only succeeds if it begins with a framework of
traditional gender norms. This is not the pure, positive analysis depicted
in the theory of economic methods.
149. See Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P2d 196, 207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Mahoney v.
Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 533 (N.J. 1982).
150. See, In re the Marriage of Olar, 747 P2d 676, 682 (Colo. 1987) (collecting cases in
other jurisdictions); Graham v. Graham, 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978). But see O'Brien
v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 713 (N.Y. 1985).
151. For examples of these proposals, see, PARKMAN, supra note 38; Borenstein &
Courant, supra note 38. See also Kristian Bolin, The Marriage Contract and Efficient
Rules for Spousal Support, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 493 (1994).
152. See, e.g., Rhode & Minow, supra note 99.
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III. CAN FAMILIES BE EFFICIENT?
Economists writing about the family make both positive and
normative efficiency claims: the positive claim that family life is (or can
be) productively efficient, and the normative claim that law should
promote efficiencies in the family. The positive analysis begins with the
postulate that households are productively efficient, and then "explains"
this efficiency with a model of specialization and division of labor by
gender. In the normative analysis, policies that appear to undermine the
traditional gender-based division of labor in the family, such as the
advent of no-fault divorce, are then subject to criticism on efficiency
grounds. Nowhere in this cycle, however, is the initial postulate closely
examined.
Feminist economists, of course, have pointed out this mistake.'53
Their more traditional colleagues regularly miss this point for two
important reasons. First, in most economic analysis, social facts are
simply taken as given, treated as exogenous or outside the scope of
analysis. This is particularly true of social facts based on gender, which
writers including Becker regularly render in biological terms, suggesting
that they are inevitable and immutable.154 If, as feminists argue, gender
roles are a more complex phenomenon, socially constructed and subject
to challenge, debate, and reformulation, then any analysis based on
assumed gender facts is subject to question as well.
Second, the economic analysis understands the family based on the
model of the market as an arena in which rational behavior prevails and
in which individuals are well informed and able to make free choices. As
discussed above, this analysis tends to suppress the reality of serious
conflicts over wealth, power, and other goods in the family, substituting
an assumption that behavior is not only rational, but benevolent and
153. See supra notes 44-58, 63-66 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., BECKER, FAMILY, supra note 4, at 37-40, 44-48; see also POSNER, SEx AND
REASON, supra note 27, at 85-110; Richard A. Epstein, Two Challenges for Feminist
Thought, 18 HAv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 331, 333-43 (1995). Professor Epstein, for
example, is willing to make both positive and normative arguments from biology. He
asserts that societies can increase their overall social welfare if biological sex differenc-
es are exploited through a specialization of labor. This leads to the conclusion that
traditional, gender-structured social roles will be more efficient. See Epstein, supra,
at 339-43. The assumption of these roles is described by Epstein in terms of
"voluntary transactions between the sexes," a phrase which masks the deterministic
nature of his model. Epstein, supra, at 343. For a persuasive critique of how biology
is used in Epstein's writing, see Case, supra note 72.
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altruistic.155 For feminists, who have been particularly concerned with the
constrained opportunities women face and with the role that force and
violence play in controlling women, both in the family and in the larger
society, this is an impossibly idealized view of how family relationships
are constituted.
With the narrow language economists have employed to describe the
family, the issues most central to feminist concerns are defined out of the
project. At best, we can say that the understanding proposed in this work
is interesting, and occasionally useful, but too narrow to encompass all
of the concerns and values we hold with family life. At worst, we may
be suspicious that economic efficiency arguments serve to further rein-
force and justify a social reality which is often systematically harmful to
women. Because economic theory has been oblivious to so many of these
conflicts, it is hard to imagine what a different economics could tell us.
Feminist theory suggests that the terms of a descriptive system are
heavily influenced by the normative commitments of its practitioners.
This interdependence of descriptive and prescriptive accounts is an
important reason why the boundary between positive and normative
economic theory is so difficult to maintain. The limitations of the
current descriptive theories in family economics are the reason for much
of the present difficulty with its prescriptive judgments.
The problem is deeper than a question of whether a certain set of
practices is efficient. We cannot determine whether resources are allo-
cated efficiently until we know what resources to consider, what types of
uses count and what values we wish to maximize. When different claims
or interests conflict, we cannot resolve which should prevail unless we
have a means for comparison. In the market, the metric for such a
comparison is money; in the family, there is no comparable scale.
Without a common denominator, there is no basis for testing the
assertion that one arrangement is more efficient than another. 5 '
155. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text. But see Becker, Economic Way, supra
note 28; Boulding, supra note 41.
156. This statement assumes that a financial metric is not a satisfactory basis for measuring
or comparing different family arrangements, for the reasons discussed in part II. As
Cass Sunstein argues, wealth maximization is too narrow a normative grounding for
law because it does not enable consideration of various incommensurable goods at
stake in a given situation, and the risks of harm to those goods from a proposed
decision. He suggests that part of the normative project of law is determining which
kinds of valuation are appropriate in which contexts. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MicH. L Rav. 779, 818-19 (1994).
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The validity of any normative analysis depends on the validity of the
descriptive system on which it is based. To the extent that the current
economic descriptions of the family are flawed, these models cannot be
the basis for useful policy recommendations. Feminist theorists cannot
use or accept efficiency-based arguments for family policy, because they
are based on a descriptive theory premised on the continuation of the
traditional gender system in marriage and in the world outside the family
sphere. Gender is one of the inputs into the family production function.
Until the existing positive theory can be restructured, feminist normative
economic analysis is not possible.
Feminist theorists have devoted a great deal of attention to the
forces that create and sustain the specialization of labor in the family. To
a large extent, specialization has been based upon the subordination of
women, through labor markets that do not value women or women's
work, cultural norms that channel women into domestic roles, and a
system of divorce that often results in a "family' with no specialization
of labor at all. Economic theory does not take these factors into account,
nor does it recognize problems of violence against women and discrimi-
nation in the workplace. It also fails to acknowledge the importance of
reproductive freedom and the need for both high-quality, affordable child
care and dependable public financial support for women with children.
Efficiency arguments that ignore these issues are not neutral, nor can
they be as long as the problems that many women face inside their
families and in the world beyond remain unresolved. *

